Monthly Archives: August 2016

Wages, immigration (again), and economic methodology


A while ago I wrote about a Bank of England paper investigating the effect of immigration on wages in Britain which found that “the immigrant to native ratio has a small negative impact on average British wages”. Then, some time after, I came across a paper by Julie L. Hotchkiss in the Southern Economic Journal which finds that “illegal immigrants actually raise wages for documented/native workers”. How to explain this contradiction in the economic evidence?

The first thing to note is that the Bank’s researchers, Stephen Nickell and Jumana Saleheen, are looking at slightly different question to Hotchkiss. Nickell and Saleheen are looking at immigration in general, Hotchkiss only at that part of it which is illegal.

Second, they are also looking at different data. Nickell and Saleheen are looking at data from Britain, Hotchkiss from the US state of Georgia.

But should this matter? Should not an economic theory which predicts that, ceteris paribus, an increase in immigration will raise/lower wages in Britain also predict the same for Georgia? In his excellent History of Economic Thought, Lewis H. Haney called the belief that the answer to this question is Yes ‘cosmopolitanism’ and the belief that the answer will be Yes at any point in time ‘perpetualism’.

That seems to depend on which theory you mean. As I wrote of Nickell and Saleheen’s paper, “In the short run at least, this is what economic theory would lead you to expect. If you increase the supply of anything relative to the demand for it, ceteris paribus, the price of that thing, whether it is shoes or labour, will fall.” But Hotchkiss applies a different bit of economic theory, that of comparative advantage, and finds the opposite. So which theory to apply?

The theory of comparative advantage is one of the old workhorses of economics. It states that Country A should specialise in the production of the good or service A that it produces most efficiently, even if it also produces good or service B more efficiently than Country B. This will lead to more efficient production and, via trade, make both countries better off. The more countries there are, the more they can specialise, the more productive they become, and the better off everyone is, so the theory goes.

Hotchkiss applies this to illegal immigration. Illegal immigrants “with limited English skills” (I’m quoting Art Carden’s write up here) coming into Georgia and finding jobs   “frees up low-skill American workers who can then specialize in tasks that require better English”.

That makes theoretical sense, but it isn’t happening in Britain, according to Nickell and Saleheen. Perhaps this is because the premium on speaking English particularly well isn’t all that high lower down the value chain in the UK. Consider Mike Ashley’s Sports Direct warehouse where the signs are posted in English and Polish. There would seem to be little advantage accruing to a native English speaking employee over his or her Polish immigrant colleague from their greater language skills.

It is interesting to speculate on the microeconomic differences between the British and Georgian labour market that allow for so much more specialisation in linguistic ability lower down the value chain in Georgia than there would seem to be in Britain. After all, these differences would seem to determine whether we apply standard supply and demand analysis to the question of immigration’s impact on wages, or the theory of comparative advantage.

But how much of this is fitting theory to the facts? When I read Nickell and Saleheen’s paper I thought “Well, that’s what standard supply and demand analysis would predict”. Did Hotchkiss, I wonder, see her results and think “Well, that’s what the theory of comparative advantage would predict”? Imagine if the British results had also shown a positive impact on wages from immigration. Would I then have thought to myself “Well, that’s what the theory of comparative advantage would predict”? If so, whither economic theory?

Prior to conducting the analysis on British and Georgian data, we would not have known which theory to apply and, hence, could have made no predictions. If, for example, you assumed that comparative advantage applied to the British labour market you would have predicted that immigration would cause wages to rise, as in Georgia. When confronted with the result, that immigration actually causes wages to fall in Britain, you would conclude that your prediction was wrong and that your theory had been falsified. But if you had gone through the same process in Georgia, your prediction would have been borne out and your theory would stand.

These are fundamental questions of economic methodology. Economists generate theories which make predictions such as ‘if X then Y‘.Governments spend large sums of money according to these predictions based on these theories. Is it the case, however, that the appropriate economic theory is entirely contingent on the particular circumstance in which it is applied?

I generally consider myself a cosmopolitan perpetualist in economic methodology. This can lead to situations where, when data contradicts theory, I assume that the data is faulty, that it must be failing to take some relevant factor or magnitude into account. But if there is even a question over which theory to apply in the first place, whither economic methodology?

Helicopter money – An introduction


Your humble narrator recently had an article in the Wall Street Journal about the new idea in monetary policy, ‘helicopter money’. An earlier draft had a rather tedious discussion of what it was. Mercifully excised from the printed version, I still thought it might be worth sharing. I’ve little doubt you’ll be hearing more about it soon…

Helicopter money takes its name from a 1969 paper by Milton Friedman called The Optimum Quantity of Money. In it Friedman set out to investigate just that. To analyse how people would adjust their cash holdings to achieve this optimum if the money supply were increased, he conducted a thought experiment in which a helicopter flew over a country dropping newly printed money. The point was simply to model an exogenous increase in the money supply, much as David Hume had in his 1752 essay Of Money. Indeed, Friedman also imagined a furnace destroying piles of cash in an effort to model the effects of an exogenous decrease in the money supply. The key point is that when Friedman wrote about helicopter money, he was not advocating anything like the policies currently bearing that title.

How has it come to this? Since the crash of 2008-2009, developed country economies have been stuck with sluggish growth. Their governments also have historically high peacetime levels of debt and new borrowing. With fiscal policy thus constrained, if stimulus is to be administered it is the central banks who will have to do so using monetary policy. Still others think that fiscal policy would be ineffective in any event. Either way, central banks are, as Mohamed El-Erian has written recently, the only game in town.

But the record of monetary policy’s impact is mixed. In 2002, Bernanke gave a speech frequently cited by advocates of activist monetary policy in which he argued that “under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation”. But in recent years it hasn’t worked like that. Central banks have churned out new base money and pumped it into the banking system in return for (government) bonds, Quantitative Easing. As a result, in Britain, the monetary base has risen by 516% since May 2006. But, for the most part, this money has just sat on bank balance sheets; they have not used it as the basis for the creation of new credit. Hence, over the same period, broad money has risen by just 53%. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy via the banking system is blocked and increases in base money have not filtered through to increases in spending, also known as nominal GDP or aggregate demand. JK Galbraith’s old quip about expansive monetary policy “pushing on a string” has never been truer.

To look at it another way, consider the equation of exchange from your economics textbooks, one form of which is MV=Py. This says that the money supply (M) multiplied by the velocity of circulation (V) equals the price level (P) multiplied by output (y). Velocity of circulation – how many times in a given period a unit of money is spent – can serve as a useful proxy for the demand for money. If the demand to hold money increases, its velocity (V) falls. Conversely, if that demand falls and people want to swap their money holdings for goods or services, V rises. Velocity is the inverse of the demand for money.

When mortgage backed assets tanked in 2008, banks saw their balance sheets ravaged. They desperately demanded cash to shore them up, their V had fallen, in other words. In an effort to ward off a fall in prices and/or output (Py), central banks offset this by increasing M via low interest rates and QE.

But if the aim is to use increases in M to boost Py then the new money must be given to people whose demand to hold money has either fallen or not risen (their V is constant or rising); to put money in the hands of those who would spend it and boost prices rather than hold it as banks have done. This is where the helicopter comes in.

The success of this policy all depends on whether raising a nominal variable (the price level, P) will also raise a real variable (output, or y), that there is a Phillips’ Curve relationship, in other words. This is the notion of an inverse relationship between inflation and employment, which was long presumed dead among the rubble of the Stagflationary 1970s.

This is a point I intend to return to soon. 


Central Bankers Are All ‘Corbynistas’ Now



Your humble narrator is in the Wall Street Journal Europe again today. I’m arguing that increasingly popular and respectable monetary policies, in this instance ‘helicopter money’, are little different to the People’s Quantitative Easing announced by British Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn just less than a year ago, and widely mocked.  “They’re not laughing now”, as the great economist Bob Monkhouse used to joke.